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Abstract  
We study the ownership structure of joint-stock firms for the period of 1869 to 1945 based on 
a unique hand-collected data set. The data covers a selection of 785 general meetings of 276 
firms, including details of more than 10,000 investors. We show that after the hyperinflation of 
1923, when shares became cheaper, the ownership share among lower social classes rose 
significantly. Moreover, with the rise of women rights after 1919, the number of shares owned 
by women also increased significantly. However, despite these shifts, the majority of shares 
remained in the hands of institutional investors and investors from the upper class, who mainly 
constituted and controlled the general meetings. Thus, despite the increased participation of 
women and the lower social classes, a stark inequality of opportunities persisted. 
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1 Introduction 
Rising inequality is one of the most recognised and debated issues of our times, and this debate 
tends to focus on income inequality (see, for instance, Piketty & Saez, 2003; Piketty, 2015). 
Capital, however, was always more unequally distributed than labour in all countries and 
periods for which data is available. Piketty (2014, p. 244) gives some idea of the order of 
magnitude: The upper 10 per cent of the labour income distribution generally receives 25–30 
per cent of total labour income, whereas the top 10 per cent of the capital income distribution 
always owns more than 50 per cent of all wealth, and in some societies, this is as much as 90 
per cent. While the bottom 50 per cent of the wage distribution always receives a significant 
share of the labour income, the bottom 50 per cent of the wealth distribution mostly owns 
nothing at all.  
Yet, the interwar period saw great changes in wealth distribution: The capital/income 
ratio and the share of private capital as a percentage of the national income were higher before 
World War I than they are today (Piketty, 2014, pp. 144–146). In the interwar period, both rates 
declined severely, and capital worth nearly a year and a half of national income was destroyed. 
The budgetary and political shocks of two wars proved far more destructive for capital than the 
actual combat. According to Piketty (2014, p. 148), the main factors explaining the fall in the 
capital/income ratio were the collapse of foreign portfolios, low savings rates, and the Great 
Depression, during which many stock- and bondholders were ruined as firm after firm went 
bankrupt. Moreover, low growth, repeated recessions, and the high inflation resulting in the 
hyperinflation of 1923 led many wealthy people to lose vast amounts of their assets even before 
the Great Depression unfolded. 
However, it also brought about new opportunities for people from lower social classes 
because shares became cheaper in the interwar period. The ubiquitous characteristic of 
shareowners shortly before the outbreak of World War I was their wealth: Before 1884, the 
minimum face value of a share was 300 marks – only 40 per cent of which had to be paid before 
the IPO. With offerings below par being prohibited, the minimum investment to buy one share 
was thus 120 marks. Stock market shares were therefore still well within the reach of the middle 
classes. After 1884, however, the corporate law increased the minimum face value of a share 
to 1,000 marks, and an IPO was only possible for fully paid shares. Thus, the minimum 
investment increased by a factor of eight (Burhop, 2011, p. 16). This can be compared to the 
average annual wage of a German industrial worker in 1913 of 1,300 marks (authors’ 
calculation based on Bry, 1960). Thus, it is unlikely that workers or even middle class 
employees held shares in this period. However, the post-war inflation dramatically changed 
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access to stocks. The journalist Sebastian Haffner (2002, p. 56) describes in his memoirs that 
with hyperinflation and the fading away of savings, mortgages and other conservative 
investments, many people started to buy shares on the stock market. He describes how shares 
seemed to be an island of security able to maintain pace with inflation. He writes that low-level 
civil servants, ordinary employees and even shift workers became shareholders. The whole 
population was following the exchange reports. Stock market recommendations were 
exchanged in shops, factories and schools. However, Aron (1927) showed that although about 
53 per cent of capital of joint-stock companies were shifted among groups of investors, firms 
made sure that most shares were traded among large shareholders by granting them special 
conditions such as buying shares on account.  
Thus, motivated by research on wealth inequality, we aim at contributing to this 
literature by extending the term ‘inequality’ to ‘equality of opportunities’ by studying capital 
ownership among different social groups in the period of 1869 to 1945. Therefore, we hand-
collected a new data set, covering all shareholder lists from general meetings available at the 
archives of Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, the Hessian Economic Archive, the Baden 
Wuerttemberg Economic Archive and the Bavarian Economic Archive. Altogether, we 
collected 785 shareholder lists from 276 companies, covering basic information for 10,017 
individual investors. Especially after 1913, usually more than 50 per cent of capital was 
represented at the meetings. Thus, although we only observe the characteristics of investors that 
attended the general meetings, we observe a substantial part of all investors and especially those 
that influenced the company’s fate. Thus, our research also contributes to the literature on 
corporate governance.  
Based on our unique data set, we are able to show that while, in the German Empire, 
shares of joint-stock companies were only available to a small group of rich investors, after the 
hyperinflation of 1923, shares became more widely available to the middle class. Lower social 
classes, however, did not own shares in our observation period. Moreover, we are particularly 
interested in the gender perspective. Women’s rights drastically improved in 1919. In the 
constitution of the first German democracy, women officially received equal rights, which is 
mostly reflected in the fact that they were now allowed to vote (Art. 109 Abs. 2 Weimar 
Constitution). However, the National Socialists again restricted these rights. After 1933, women 
were confined to the roles of mother and spouse and were excluded from all positions of 
responsibility, notably in the political and academic spheres. These developments are also 
reflected in the ownership structure. During the Weimar Republic, women had had a much 
stronger representation at general meetings than before, but their overall ownership of shares 
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remained low, and 98 per cent of female investors that we observe were engaged in only a 
single firm. Overall, despite our observation of greater participation among women after 1919, 
their increased political power was clearly not equally accompanied by a rise in economic 
power. It is also possible that the higher attendance of women at general meetings does not 
actually represent a larger share of capital ownership but rather the fact that women started to 
use their power by attending the meetings. This may be supported by our observation that, after 
1919, we observe more women holding smaller numbers of shares. 
To our knowledge, our work is the first that provides insights into investors’ 
characteristics, such as their social class and gender, in the period of 1869 to 1945. While 
surveys provide good information about who holds and trades shares nowadays, very little is 
known about investors in earlier periods and how the composition of investors changed over 
time. Occasionally, we find published lists of applicants for shares – such as, for instance, the 
list of the first buyers of shares of Deutsche Bank (Pohl, 1987; Bol, 2018) or other selected 
samples (Fohlin, 2007, pp. 120–124). Franks et al. (2006) provide the largest sample. They 
collected 156 lists of general meetings during the same period we cover, but they focus on 
ownership concentration and the share of founding-family ownerships. Burhop and Lehmann-
Hasemeyer (2016) also provide some insights from lists of general meetings. They studied the 
geography of German stock exchanges and showed that there seemed to be a preference for 
local shares on regional stock exchanges. Neumayer (2018) also studied the home bias based 
on a selected sample, showing that the home bias disappears if a general meeting did not take 
place close to the headquarters of the firm. However, none of the research above studies 
investors’ social characteristics.  
Learning more about the shareholders is important not just in terms of inequality and 
social history, it is also interesting from a finance perspective. As Markowitz (1952) already 
pointed out in the 1950s, portfolio theory assumes that investors form expectations about returns 
and risks of securities, and they select portfolios according to their expectations and risk 
preferences. In consequence, rational economic actors should diversify portfolios and trade very 
little. However, at least for modern periods, private investors have been shown to hold under-
diversified portfolios (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008), to trade frequently (Odean, 1998; Barber 
and Odean, 2000), to take on high idiosyncratic risk (Calvet et al., 2007), and to gamble (Kumar, 
2009). Clearly, socioeconomic characteristics matter a great deal here. Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2008) have shown, for instance, that the level of under-diversification of portfolios is greater 
among younger, low-income, less-educated, and less-sophisticated investors. Barber and Odeon 
(2011) have shown that men take higher risks than women, and younger investors take more 
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risks than older ones. Studies testing reactions to historical events on stock markets can 
therefore only infer whose reactions they are actually testing.2 However, knowing who actually 
traded on the stock market, who influences decisions of joint-stock firms and how the 
composition of investors changed over time is crucial for the understanding of stock market 
development and determinants of the success and failure of firms. 
 
2 Overview of sources and shortcomings of the data3 
Information on share ownership of investors is, in large parts, unavailable, because most of the 
shares were bearer shares (Burhop, 2011, p. 15). Furthermore, there are also no complete 
shareholder records of firms, which we could use for our analysis. Therefore, we take another 
source of shareholder information into account using the fact that under the Stock Exchange 
Act of 1896, companies were legally bound to submit information about their shareholder 
structure to the respective stock exchange on which their shares were listed (Franks et al., 2006, 
pp. 542 and 554). Besides a company’s prospectus, extracts from the register of commerce, the 
current company status and the annual management reports, lists of shareholders attending the 
general assembly had to be provided to the stock exchange operator of the respective stock 
exchange. For example, this was often the case if the general assembly voted to increase or 
reduce equity.  
The data on individual firms were collected from the Hessian Economic Archive 
(Hessisches Wirtschaftsarchiv), the Bavarian Economic Archive (Bayerisches 
Wirtschaftsarchiv) and the Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (Baden-
Württembergisches Wirtschaftsarchiv), as well as from the Historical Archive of Deutsche 
Bank AG and from the Historical Archive of Commerzbank AG.4 The data includes filings of 
the Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Essen, Augsburg, Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart 
stock exchanges. We extract the name of the company, the industrial sector, the location of the 
headquarters and the place where the general assembly took place. Data on the share capital of 
a company and the stock exchanges on which the company’s shares were listed is from the 
Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. The Handbuch der deutschen 
Aktiengesellschaften only exists since 1896, but based on the included information, we are able 
to calculate the share capital for earlier periods for general meetings that took place before 1896. 
                                                          
2 To name a few, Thorsten Lübbers (2008) and Kling (2006) studied investor reaction to firm mergers in the 19th 
century and the interwar period, Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. (2014) studied how suffrage extensions to the 
working class affected stock market prices, and Opitz (2017) tested reactions to riots and wars. 
3 The following paragraph draws heavily on Neumayer (2018). 
4 For an overview and a description of the data and the signature, see appendix.  
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The information of the shareholder data includes gender or institution, name of every 
shareholder and his/her city of residence. In the vast majority of cases, however, these hand-
collected databases of shareholder information are incomplete due to different protocols and 
layouts, which reduces the number of usable observations depending on the requested 
information. In many cases, only the name and residence of the shareholders are reported, and 
furthermore, there is no information on occupation or branches of shareholders. In some cases, 
the address was left blank. For 4,175 shareholders, we also have information on title and 
occupation. For those observations, we classify the investors into social classes.5 Data on the 
number of shares, the share capital of the investors and how many votes were cast are also taken 
from the shareholder attendance lists. In addition, we calculate the distance between a 
company’s headquarters and the residences of every single shareholder to obtain a distance 
measure. Distances are calculated as straight lines.  
Another bias in the data is that the information only covers investors attending the 
meetings or general assemblies. Those investors who did not attend the assemblies remain 
unknown. In addition, many investors are represented in these meetings and assemblies by, for 
example, banks or bank directors. In many cases, there is only information on the authorised 
representative, but not on the represented investors. There is also no data on how shareholders 
exercised their voting rights, only information on how many votes are cast. We did not use lists 
in which we observe too many outliers or missing values. Furthermore, the probability of 
investors attending such assemblies is higher for those who live in the same region in which the 
general assembly took place (see Neumayer, 2018). However, since we observe the 
characteristics of investors that attended a general meeting, we observe those that actually 
influenced a company’s fate.  
Table 1, Panel A reports the number of companies, the number of investors and the 
number of investors distributed into six time periods, where the economic conditions and/or the 
political system significantly changed. The period of 1869 to 1913 covers the meetings that 
took place during the Empire, 1914 to 1918 covers the meetings during World War I, and 1919 
to 1923 covers the meetings in the first years of the Weimar Republic, with high levels of 
inflation resulting in the hyperinflation of 1923. The period of 1924 to 1928 covers the meetings 
that took place during the middle period of the Weimar Republic, which was characterised by 
relative economic and political stability but ended with the Great Depression in the subsequent 
years of 1929 to 1933. Our last period covers the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler and World War 
                                                          
5 The classification into social classes follows Schüren (1989) and is discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  
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II. We did not treat World War II separately, because trading became very restricted during the 
Nazi regime until 1945. 
 
Table 1: Sample characteristics 
Panel A: Distribution by period 
Decade Number of companies 
Number of general 
assemblies (GAs) Number of investors 
Average share of 
present capital 
1869–1913 44 112 1,858 36.51 
1914–1918 16 27 340 53.03 
1919–1923 139 277 3,127 51.15 
1924–1928 103 152 3,360 70.76 
1929–1933 85 144 1,958 71.03 
1934–1945 39 73 804 64.85 
Total 276 785 10,017 59.75 
Panel B: Distribution of general meetings by industry 
Industry6 1869–1913 1914–1918 1919–1923 1924–1928 1929–1933 1934–1945 
Banking 47 8 19 19 8 5 
Insurance   5 6  1 
Mining 4 2 12 3 7 3 
Heavy 
Industry 2 2 29 11 19 17 
Light Industry 23 8 93 36 53 29 
Food 
Processing 23 3 47 11 13 6 
Transportation 1 1 6 12 8 6 
Chemical 
Industry 3  3 4 1  
Public Utility 5  18 23 13 3 
Diverse 4 3 45 26 22 3 
Total 112 27 277 151 144 73 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Median Min Max 
Number of 
general meetings 
per company 
2.84 3.31 2 1 24 
Duration for 
which firms are 
included in the 
sample 
4.19 6.42 1 0 35.06 
                                                          
6 The heavy industry category contains: engineering firms, metal working, and railway requirements. Light 
industry contains: textile sector, paper industry, glass industry, and rubber industry. Food processing contains: 
breweries and mills. Public utility contains: electricity, and gas and water. Diverse contains: hotel companies, 
terrain companies, and mortgage banks. Source: Various, please see Appendix.  
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Overall, our sample contains 276 companies with 10,017 investors attending 785 general 
assemblies. The number of meetings in our data set varies with periods. In the first period, we 
observe 112 general assemblies of 44 firms with 1,858 investors. The number of general 
meetings drops in the period of World War I and rises to 103 firms, with information on 3,360 
investors attending 152 general assemblies, in the period of the Golden Twenties. This number 
drops again after 1933 to 39 firms, with information on 804 investors and 73 general assemblies. 
Overall, about sixty percent of the share capital was represented at the meetings. 
However, in the Empire years, the attendance was much lower than in the period of the 
Weimar Republic. This fits the observations by Fohlin (2007, pp. 122–124) and Franks et al. 
(2006). However, the attendance significantly increased during the Weimar Republic after 
1923, when, on average, more than half of the capital was represented. Fohlin (2007, p. 124) 
also cites Richard Passow (1922), a contemporary observer, who lists some explanations for 
the low attendance rates at shareholder meetings. She summarises his ideas as “rational apathy” 
among small shareholders: cost of travelling to locations where the meetings took place, 
insufficient time to attend, the sense that news coverage provided sufficient information for the 
small shareholders, and the presumption among small shareholders that their influence was 
limited. Passow (1922) also mentioned that women would not attend the meetings, since they 
were not believed to be able to handle them. Thus, the fact that more investors attended the 
meetings during the Weimar Republic could be driven by a higher concentration and therefore 
a lower share of smaller shareholders, cheaper transport costs, a greater desire for first-hand 
information and an increasing acceptance of female capital owners. Panel B provides 
information about the branches of the firms in our sample. The branches are divided into 10 
categories: banking, insurance, mining, heavy industry, light industry, food processing, 
transportation, chemical industry, public utilities and diverse. Our sample consists mainly of 
banks, firms from the heavy and light industries, and breweries. The highest number of firms 
comes from the light-industrial sector. This category includes textiles, paper, glass and rubber. 
Furthermore, there is a high number of hotel companies, terrain companies and mortgage banks 
in the sample. Table 1, Panel C reports some further descriptive characteristics about the 
number of meetings we observe per firm. Overall, we observe, on average, 2.84 meetings per 
company over an average period of 4.19 years.  
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3 Concentration 
In this section, we examine the concentration of ownership. There are only few studies on 
ownership and control in historical perspective. For Germany, the pioneering study is from 
Franks et al. (2006), which analyses the ownership structure of 55 companies based on 156 
shareholder lists and finds that ownership concentration was quite high and even increased 
slightly over time. Their findings are in strong contrast to the UK. Acheson et al. (2015) analyse 
corporate ownership in their comprehensive historical study for the second half of the 19th 
century in the UK, and they find evidence that, first, ownership tends to disperse over time and 
that firms headquartered in London and with shares listed at multiple stock exchanges had more 
widely dispersed ownerships. Second, generally, ownership concentration was lower in the 
Victorian Britain of 1900 than in modern Britain. Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) studied 
the divorce of ownership and control in pre-World War I Britain. They looked at the ownership 
structure of 337 listed companies and found evidence of a divorce of ownership and control. 
Manager-owners and board members controlled little capital and few votes.7 
 
Table 2: Number of shareholders attending the meetings 
Panel A Mean Median Min Max Per cent of capital present 
Number of 
general 
meetings 
1869–1913 26.6 20 2 248 36.51 112 
1914–1917 18.3 13 2 153 53.03 27 
1918–1922 17.3 12 2 249 51.15 277 
1923–1928 29.3 13 2 582 70.76 152 
1929–1933 20.3 10 2 282 71.03 144 
1934–1945 17.9 10 2 97 64.85 73 
Total 21.6 13 2 582 59.75 785 
Source: Various, please see Appendix. Note: This table reports the number of shareholders in the sample. 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. In contrast to Franks et al. (2006), our 
values do seem particularly stable over time. Before 1913, the mean number of shareholders 
was 26.6. This falls to 18.3 for the meetings during World War I, rising again in the period after 
the hyperinflation and before the Great Depression, before dropping to about 18 under the Nazi 
reign. However, the median did not change much over time, remaining between 10 and 20 over 
                                                          
7 Further studies by Franks et al. (2009) and Hannah (2007) also deal with the development of the ownership 
structure of British companies over time. For US corporations, there is still debate regarding the extent to which 
ownership and control were separated (for a review, see Cheffins and Banks, 2009). Moreover, several studies 
analyse ownership and control for the US in more detail (see, for instance, Hilt, 2008, and Holderness et al., 
1999).  
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the whole period, which is equal to Franks et al.’s (2006) calculations. Similar to Franks et al. 
(2006), the maximum number of investors is mostly above 100, showing that the method is 
perfectly capable of identifying large numbers of shareholders. The largest number of 
shareholders appeared at the 1932 general meeting of Mannesmannröhren-Werke, a large steel 
producer headquartered in Berlin and with a share capital of 6 million Reichsmark. At this 
meeting, 582 investors were present, representing 46 per cent of the company’s share capital.  
In Table 3, we report different measures of ownership concentration. We use the same measures 
as Franks et al. (2006) in their seminal article. These are C1, C3, and C5 – the combined votes 
of the largest, the three largest, and the five largest shareholders, respectively. Cthreshold is 
defined as the minimum number of shareholders necessary to cast 25 per cent of the present 
votes, and Herfindahl is the overall distribution of represented capital/votes cast. For a better 
comparison with the findings of Franks et al. (2006), we include their calculations (Panel C) 
and our calculations grouped into the similar periods (Panel B). Similar to Franks et al. (2006), 
we find no reduction of concentration over time. Indeed, if anything, concentration seems to 
slightly increase. On average, the largest shareholder held about 47 per cent of shares, which 
means that, in most cases, this investor alone could provide more than 25 per cent of the votes. 
The Herfindahl index also increases from 32 to 35 during the Weimar Republic. Overall, 
however, we find a much lower rise than Franks et al. (2006), but higher overall values. The 
average Herfindahl calculated by Franks et al. (2006) ranges between 23 and 29 in the period 
1900–1920, whereas we measure average levels of 33.5 per cent. Given that the median number 
of investors is fairly stable, the fact that more capital was represented at the shareholder 
meetings rather reflects the rising concentration in the form of rising shares of the attending 
investors, not a rise in the number of smaller shareholders attending the meetings. 
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Table 3: Ownership concentration over time 
 
C1 C3 C5 Cthreshold Herfindahl 
Number of 
general 
meetings 
Panel A: Periods according to historical structural breaks 
1869–1913 0.45 0.66 0.75 1.40 0.32 112 
1914–1917 0.46 0.60 0.72 1.04 0.31 27 
1918–1922 0.47 0.70 0.81 1.18 0.34 277 
1923–1928 0.48 0.69 0.80 1.12 0.35 152 
1929–1933 0.48 0.70 0.78 1.27 0.35 144 
1934–1945 0.46 0.71 0.82 1.28 0.32 73 
1869–1945 0.47 0.69 0.79 1.22 0.34 785 
Panel B: Periods in decades according to Franks et al. (2006)* 
1870 0.28 0.65 0.79 1.50 0.18 2 
1890 0.46 0.79 0.89 1.17 0.34 6 
1900 0.42 0.66 0.76 1.55 0.31 45 
1910 0.46 0.64 0.73 1.26 0.32 68 
1920 0.47 0.70 0.81 1.17 0.35 353 
1930 0.47 0.69 0.78 1.23 0.34 280 
1940 0.49 0.76 0.86 1.23 0.35 30 
all 0.28 0.65 0.79 1.50 0.18 785 
Panel C: Calculations from Franks et al. (2006, p. 564) 
1890 0.33 0.60 0.71 1.88 0.18 8 
1900 0.42 0.70 0.80 1.32 0.23 19 
1910 0.46 0.73 0.83 1.21 0.27 29 
1920 0.47 0.75 0.86 1.32 0.29 41 
1930 0.44 0.75 0.86 1.22 0.23 36 
1940 0.58 0.82 0.90 1.00 0.37 17 
1950 0.51 0.76 0.86 1.00 0.31 6 
all 0.46 0.74 0.84 1.26 0.27 156 
Source: See Appendix, authors’ own calculations, *Firm observations are allocated to the nearest corresponding 
decade. 
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4 Gender, Social Classes and Institutional Investors – Descriptive 
Statistics 
In this section, we provide information about how many men, women and institutional investors 
were present at general assemblies and how this composition changed within the nearly 50 years 
of our observation period. Further, we analyse the distribution of investors categorised into 
social classes over time. This is the first study that investigates social classes and gender 
distribution of investors on German stock exchanges before 1945. Despite rare studies on 
individual investors, such as those by John Maynard Keynes (Chambers et al., 2013, 2015, 
2016) and Joseph Frisch (see Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Neumayer, 2018), the only comparable 
studies covering our observation period were for England (Rutterford et al., 2017; Sotiropoulos 
and Rutterford, 2018). 
We define gender and whether it was a private or institutional investor primarily named 
on the list. Following this procedure, we observe a total of 647 female investors, of which 24 
were classified as widows. Furthermore, we observe 8,334 male investors and 992 institutional 
investors (see Table 4). In four cases, married couples were mentioned as investors. We 
assigned these cases to female investors, assuming that the women had a say if they were 
mentioned. In 44 other cases, we only have information that a representative of a group of heirs 
or communities acted as investors. These are summarised in the category ‘unspecific’.  
These total numbers certainly underestimate the impact of institutional investors, since 
while most other investors only appeared once or twice, some institutional investors appeared 
every year for more than one firm and held larger shares. This is better reflected in the shares 
per period (Panel B). The share of male investors fell from 87.9 per cent to about 67.9 per cent 
under the Nazi reign. In comparison, the share of women drops from the first to the second 
period (3.7 per cent to 1.5 per cent), rising then to 9.8 per cent in the period after the 
hyperinflation, but then falling again to about 4.2 per cent in the period under the reign of the 
National Socialists. Regarding the institutional investors attending the meetings, we obtain a 
constant rise from 7.5 to 27.5 percent. Panel C shows the average share of votes for the different 
groups. In most cases, we have the number of votes for each investor. If we do not have the 
vote, we assume that the share of capital equals the share of votes. The share of female votes 
seems to have been lowest for all groups. The average share of men was the largest. However, 
this distribution is highly skewed. Panel D shows the average impact of women, if we include 
the meetings in which no woman was present with a zero vote. Thus, it reflects the actual 
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average impact of women per period. As one can see, the share is very low and never reaches 
more than 5 per cent. It is interesting that especially in the period 1924–1928, where we observe 
 
Table 4: Gender – Descriptive statistics 
  Women Men Institutional 
investors 
Unspecific Total 
Panel A: Totals 
1869–1913 68 1634 139 17 1858 
1914–1918 5 307 27 1 340 
1919–1923 155 2694 276 6 3131 
1924–1928 330 2598 424 10 3362 
1929–1933 80 1602 269 8 1959 
1934–1945 34 548 222 2 806 
Total 647 8334 992 44 10017 
Panel B: In per cent 
1869–1913 3.66 87.94 7.48 0.91 100 
1914–1918 1.47 90.29 7.94 0.29 100 
1919–1923 4.95 86.04 8.82 0.19 100 
1924–1928 9.82 77.28 12.61 0.30 100 
1929–1933 4.08 81.78 13.73 0.41 100 
1934–1945 4.22 67.99 27.54 0.25 100 
Total 6.46 83.20 9.90 0.44 100 
Panel C: Average share of votes per person 
1869–1913 5.79 2.92 9.48 0.94 
 
1914–1918 5.20 3.78 11.19 59.87   
1919–1923 3.94 4.51 11.06 1.52 
 
1924–1928 0.77 2.55 7.85 0.13   
1929–1933 3.40 4.01 9.30 2.04 
 
1934–1945 6.91 5.71 5.12 10.28   
Total 10.85 58.06 45.25 6.69 
 
Panel D: Average share of the whole group at general meeting (0 vote if nobody from the group 
present) 
1869–1913 4.60 63.95 25.83 0.14 
 
1914–1918 1.73 52.64 28.59 2.22   
1919–1923 2.51 58.86 29.31 0.05 
 
1924–1928 1.66 48.69 41.76 0.01   
1929–1933 2.43 52.21 36.31 0.08 
 
1934–1945 4.17 54.27 36.47 0.42   
Total 2.76 55.77 33.14 0.17   
Source: Various, please see Appendix. Authors’ own calculations. 
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most women, the share declines. that especially in the period 1924–1928, where we observe 
most women, the share declines. More women attended the meetings, but with smaller shares, 
whereas in the Empire years, only women with large shares attend. Any hesitations about 
attending a meeting seem to have declined, although the individual impact was low. Panel A 
reveals another interesting feature: While men obviously appear in more than one period, the 
women seem to have appeared in one or two periods only, since the sum of individual investors 
per period nearly adds up to 647. However, this could be driven by a financial engagement in 
just one firm over a number of years, and thus we further investigate not just the number of 
meetings at which investors appear, but also the number of firms with which investors were 
engaged (see Table 5). Clearly, most of our investors invested in just one firm over time. 
However, while we observe that about 9 per cent of the male investors and about 20 per cent of 
the institutional investors invested in more than one company, almost all of the women invested 
in a single firm, and only eight held shares of two different firms.  
 
Table 5: Degree of involvement by gender 
Number of firms 
in which investors 
invested 
Women Men Institutional investors Unspecific Total 
Panel A: Totals 
1 639 7588 797 43 9067 
2 8 559 102 1 670 
3 0 115 25 0 140 
4 0 38 12 0 50 
5 0 15 13 0 28 
More than 5 0 19 43 0 62 
Totals 647 8,334 992 44 10,017 
Panel B: In per cent 
1 98.76 91.05 80.34 97.73 90.52 
2 1.24 6.71 10.28 2.27 6.69 
3 0 1.38 2.52 0 1.40 
4 0 0.46 1.21 0 0.50 
5 0 0.18 1.31 0 0.28 
More than 5 0 0.23 4.33 0 0.62 
Panel C: Average engagement in years 
Mean 0.31 0.58 0.92 0.62  
Median 0 0 0 0  
Max. 22.04 35.06 26.06 35.06  
Source: Various, please see Appendix. Authors’ own calculations. 
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Furthermore, we took a closer look at the female investors to understand why the held shares 
of the particular companies. However, due to the lack of information, we can only study few 
cases. It seems, however that the female investors were often members or the founding family. 
Anna Langheinrich, for instance, held shares of Graphitwerke Kropfmühl AG in 1925. In this 
year she was also the official director of this company and therefore one of the few female 
entrepreneurs of the time (see Deutsches Aktienhandbuch, 1925, p. 549). Two further, cases 
were the female shareholders of the Papierfabrik August Koehler AG in Oberkirch and the 
Papierfabrik Wilhelm Euler in Bensheim. With Anna Maria Goetz and Wilhelmine Rettner, it 
happened that two women of the founding family were members of the supervisory board of 
both companies, since both companies held holdings together (Krämer, 2007). 
To get a better idea of who the institutional investors are, we look at them in more detail 
in Table 6. Here, we divide the investors into different industrial branches following Lehmann-
Hasemeyer and Opitz (2017). The branches are divided into 11 categories: banking, insurance, 
mining, heavy industry, light industry, food processing, transportation, chemical industry, 
public utilities, diverse, and not assignable if we could not assign the investors to a certain 
category. The highest percentage (70.26) of institutional investors comes from the banking 
sector. This does not necessarily mean that banks were the owners of the shares, as before WWI, 
banks held only a few major, long-term direct stakes in non-financial firms (Fohlin, 2007, p. 
120). However, they held substantial control over joint-stock firms through proxy voting. In the 
pre-war era, proxy voting was established in two ways. The first is irrelevant to our study: a 
shareholder could transfer his/her voting rights to a bank (Stimmrechtsermächtigung), allowing 
the bank to cast votes in the shareholder’s name. In these cases, the shareholders had to reveal 
their identity, and these details are available in the lists of the general meetings. The second 
way, which was more important in practice, was the so-called Bankenstimmrecht or 
Depotstimmrecht. This is much trickier and explains the large share of banks as institutional 
investors in our sample. According to Fohlin (2007, p. 122), many banks required their 
customers to transfer their votes automatically upon opening securities accounts, granting the 
banks a widespread ability to control rights of equity stakes they did not own. Banks could do 
more or less whatever they wished with these voting rights (see Fohlin 2007, pp. 122–124). As 
one can see, the influence of large banks was indeed high with on average more than 50 percent.  
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Table 6: Institutional Investors – Descriptive Statistics 
Sector 1896– 1913 
1914– 
1918 
1919– 
1923 
1924 
1928 
1929 
1933 
1934– 
1945 
Total 
N in percent 
Panel A: Totals 
Banking 82 22 126 184 123 160 697 70.26 
Insurance 1 1 4 14 0 3 23 2.32 
Mining 0 1 5 14 11 3 34 3.43 
Heavy industry 6 3 18 18 18 9 72 7.26 
Light industry 10 0 13 32 10 9 74 7.46 
Food processing 7 0 6 8 12 1 34 3.43 
Transportation 2 0 3 4 6 5 20 2.02 
Chemistry 0 0 4 6 2 0 12 1.21 
Public utility 1 0 8 26 19 15 69 6.96 
Diverse 9 0 77 92 59 13 250 25.20 
Not assignable 21 0 10 26 8 2 67 6.75 
Total 143 27 274 427 268 220 992  
Panel B: In per cent 
Banking 57.34 81.48 45.99 43.09 45.90 72.73 70.26 57.34 
Insurance 0.70 3.70 1.46 3.28 0.00 1.36 2.32 0.70 
Mining 0.00 3.70 1.82 3.28 4.10 1.36 3.43 0.00 
Heavy industry 4.20 11.11 6.57 4.22 6.72 4.09 7.26 4.20 
Light industry 6.99 0.00 4.74 7.49 3.73 4.09 7.46 6.99 
Food processing 4.90 0.00 2.19 1.87 4.48 0.45 3.43 4.90 
Transportation 1.40 0.00 1.09 0.94 2.24 2.27 2.02 1.40 
Chemistry 0.00 0.00 1.46 1.41 0.75 0.00 1.21 0.00 
Public utility 0.70 0.00 2.92 6.09 7.09 6.82 6.96 0.70 
Diverse 6.29 0.00 28.10 21.55 22.01 5.91 25.20 6.29 
Not assignable 14.69 0.00 3.65 6.09 2.99 0.91 6.75 14.69 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ own calculation.  
Note: The sectoral classification is from Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Opitz (2017, p. 15). The heavy industry 
category contains: engineering firms, metal working, and railway requirements. Light industry contains: the textile 
sector, paper industry, glass industry, and rubber industry. Food processing contains: breweries and mills. Public 
utility contains: electricity, gas and water. Diverse contains: hotel companies, terrain companies and mortgage 
banks. 
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We then classify the investors into social classes depending on occupation and academic title. 
Thereby, we follow the existing classification of Schüren (1989).8 Schüren analyses the history 
of social mobility in Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries, using a broad data set of thousands 
of occupational details. His work represents one of the largest and most comprehensive 
investigations of the socio-economic ascent and descent possibilities in two centuries of 
German social history. His classification is intertemporal valid and has consensus among social 
historians such as Hartmut Kaelble or Jürgen Kocka (see Schüren, 1989, pp. 313ff.). Since we 
have information about the occupations of the investors, we can easily follow the existing 
classification of Schüren and classify our occupational investors’ data into these social classes. 
Table 7 reports the classification scheme used by Schüren. He distinguishes the working class, 
the lower middle class, the higher middle class and the upper class based on occupations. The 
working class contains skilled workers, craftsman, skilled industrial workers, and lower civil 
servants and employees. The lower middle class contains small farmers, merchants, 
masters/hosts and middle civil servants and employees. The higher middle class contains full-
time farmers, medium-sized entrepreneurs and senior civil servants and top officials. The upper 
class contains mostly landowners, large manufacturers, academics and upper senior officials.  
We are aware of the fact that during our period of interest, political changes, wars and 
financial depressions, for example, led to changes in the social structure and occupational 
system of society. Therefore, occupations may have to be assigned to different social classes 
for different times. This is also already covered in the classification of Schüren. In instances 
where we only have information about the title of an investor (e.g., Prof., Dr., Ing.), we try to 
classify their occupation based on the title. For most cases, this was relatively easy, because 
most of the titles are academic titles that we can easily assign to the group of academics and the 
upper class. We also assign investors with a title of nobility (e.g., Exzellenz, Graf, Freiherr von) 
to the upper class, even if there was no indication of their profession in our data. Some of the 
investors owned an honorary title such as, for example, Geheimer Kommerzienrat, Geheimer 
Regierungsrat or Geheimer Medizinalrat. These investors were also assigned to the upper class, 
since these titles were awarded only to high-level personalities in the economy and after 
significant achievements for the common good of society.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 For the whole text of Schüren’s classification scheme, see Schüren (1989, pp. 313ff.). 
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Table 7: Social Classes – Classification Scheme 
Social classes9 
 
I. Working Class 
 
1. Skilled Workers 
2. Craftsman 
3. Skilled Industrial Workers 
4. Lower Civil Servants and Employees 
 
II. Lower Middle Class 
 
1. Small Farmers 
2. Merchants 
3. Masters and Hosts (Master Craftsmen, Innkeepers, Shopkeepers, etc.) 
4. Middle Civil Servants and Employees (Foremen, Assistants, etc.) 
 
III. Higher Middle Class 
 
1. Full-time Farmers 
2. Medium-sized Entrepreneurs (incl. Men of Private Means, Wholesalers) 
3. Senior Civil Servants and Top Officials (Engineers, Inspectors, Authorised signatories) 
 
IV. Upper Class 
 
1. Landowners, Large Manufacturers, Academics, Upper Senior Officials 
 
Source: Schüren (1989, p. 35). 
 
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of the investors divided into social classes. In total, the 
sample contains 4,175 investors for which we have information on their occupation. The 
majority come from the upper class (89.99 per cent). About 7.16 per cent come from the higher 
middle class, 2.78 per cent from the lower middle class, and only 0.07 per cent from the working 
class. Looking at the changes over time, in the first period, we find 94.72 per cent of investors 
from the upper class. In the second period, this rises to 96.70 per cent, but then it continuously 
falls to 88.45 per cent in the last period. In comparison, the share of the investors from the 
higher middle class drops from the first to the second period (3.57 per cent to 2.75 per cent), 
before rising to 8.81 per cent in the last period. We obtain a similar picture for the share of the 
lower middle class, where we see a rise from 0.55 per cent from the second period to 3.25 per 
cent in the fifth period, but then falling to 2.74 per cent in the sixth period. The proportion of 
the working class is very low, and only in the third and fifth periods is it slightly higher than 0 
(0.07 per cent, and 0.22 per cent). The table reveals that in the 19th century, most shares were 
                                                          
9 Originally, Schüren distinguished six social classes. We have omitted the subdivision of the working class into 
the lower, middle and higher working class, because there are few observations of the working class.  
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in the hands of the men of the upper class. However, this slightly changes in the 1920s, when 
ownership became more and more available to lower social classes, which is also reflected in 
the higher shares of investors from the middle and working classes.  
 
Table 8: Social Classes – Descriptive Statistics 
 Share of 
upper class 
Share of 
higher 
middle class 
Share of 
lower middle 
class 
Share of 
working class Total 
Panel A: Totals 
1869–1913 664 25 12  701 
1914–1918 176 5 1  182 
1919–1923 1294 102 46 1 1443 
1924–1928 1184 102 36  1322 
1929–1933 793 68 29 2 892 
1934–1945 291 29 9  329 
Total 3757 299 116 3 4,175 
Panel B: In per cent 
1869–1913 94.72 3.57 1.71 0.00 100 
1914–1918 96.70 2.75 0.55 0.00 100 
1919–1923 89.67 7.07 3.19 0.07 100 
1924–1928 89.56 7.72 2.72 0.00 100 
1929–1933 88.90 7.62 3.25 0.22 100 
1934–1945 88.45 8.81 2.74 0.00 100 
Total 89.99 7.16 2.78 0.07 100 
Panel C: Average share of the whole group at general meeting (0 vote if nobody from the 
group present) 
1869–1913 38.48 10.95 8.99 0.00  
1914–1918 45.07 3.72 0.49 0.00  
1919–1923 38.94 8.00 13.13 0.03  
1924–1928 34.50 3.92 5.36 0.00  
1929–1933 39.92 8.20 6.13 0.05  
1934–1945 44.71 15.87 2.42 0.00  
Total 38.99 8.43 8.37 0.05  
Source: Authors’ own calculation. The classification scheme is from Schüren (1989, p. 35).  
 
Altogether, rising democracy and price disturbances after the period of hyperinflation seem to 
be accompanied by a rising share of female investors and a rising share of investors from lower 
social classes. However, the shares of female investors and lower social classes remain 
relatively low, and we observe a rise in concentration at the same time. Thus, while these 
observations confirm our hypothesis, they also show that the joint-stock firms were still firmly 
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in the hands of few investors from the upper class and institutional investors, which were mostly 
banks. 
 
5 Correcting for selection bias 
The descriptive statistics confirm our hypothesis that the rising democracy and the price 
disturbances of hyperinflation go together with a rising share of other social classes as well as 
a rising share of female investors. However, these descriptive statistics might be biased by 
selection of available information on general meetings. In some periods, we observe more 
general meetings than in others, as well as different branches and different firm sizes. Thus, we 
aim at establishing our observations from the descriptive statistics in a more elaborate way.  
First, we construct a data set at the level of investors and years. Few investors appear 
more than once in the data set. If, for instance, investor X attends a general meeting in 1900 
and a meeting of the same firm in 1905, we would observe her twice. However, since we are 
interested in the probability of certain characteristics over time and most investors do not appear 
more than once, we stick with simple ordered logit and logit regressions and cluster the standard 
errors by investors. The dependent variables are social class rankings from 1 to 4 (regression 1 
and 2), equal to one if the investor was a woman (regression 3 and 4) or an institution (5 and 
6). Since we are mostly interested in how the probability of these characteristics changed over 
time, and especially in the period between 1924 and 1933, we add dummy variables for certain 
periods. We further control for the share of extraordinary meetings, because the incentive to 
attend these meetings might have been different. We also control for the average distance 
between an investor’s residence and the location of the general meeting as a measure of 
transport cost as well as the total number of investors per year to account for potential selection 
bias. The results, shown in Table 9, clearly confirm our descriptive statistics. The probability 
of coming from a lower social class rises declined during World War I, but increases 
significantly after 1923 and 1933. The likelihood that women became investors also rises after 
1923. The presence of institutional investors, however, seem to rise constantly over the whole 
period of observation.  
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Table 9: Probability of appearance of an investor’s characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Socialclass Women=1 Institutional investors=1 
 Ordered logit Logit 
1914–1917 -1.006**  -0.445  -0.272  
 (0.460)  (0.668)  (0.254)  
1918–1922 0.420  -1.015***  0.416***  
 (0.266)  (0.302)  (0.138)  
1923–1928 0.818***  0.190  0.813***  
 (0.249)  (0.224)  (0.142)  
1929–1933 1.040***  0.111  0.790***  
 (0.261)  (0.235)  (0.147)  
1934–1945 0.635**  0.142  1.539***  
 (0.294)  (0.297)  (0.139)  
1924–1933  0.627***  0.747***  0.327*** 
  (0.129)  (0.114)  (0.0855) 
Share of extraordinary 
meetings 0.0839 0.0697 0.958*** 1.005*** -0.168** -0.136** 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.0972) (0.0990) (0.0669) (0.0656) 
Distance from investor’s 
residence to location of 
GM 
-0.228*** -0.221*** 0.0290** 0.0313** 0.0236** 0.0290** 
 (0.0780) (0.0771) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0114) (0.0135) 
Number of investors per 
year 6.92e-05 0.000230** 0.000972*** 0.000485*** -0.000313*** -0.000367*** 
 (0.000145) (0.000117) (0.000156) (9.97e-05) (8.01e-05) (6.39e-05) 
Share of large firms -0.667*** -0.626*** -0.368*** -0.371*** 0.0187 0.0128 
 (0.157) (0.159) (0.107) (0.107) (0.0919) (0.0893) 
Constant 2.488*** 2.363***     
 (0.239) (0.160)     
Constant cut2 3.775*** 3.646***     
 (0.242) (0.170)     
Constant cut3 7.576*** 7.447***     
 (0.643) (0.623)     
Constant   -3.808*** -3.951*** -2.210*** -1.701*** 
   (0.192) (0.190) (0.134) (0.0955) 
       
Observations 6,354 6,354 14,032 14,032 14,032 14,032 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered by investors. 
 
One might argue that a logit is not able to trace the actual impact, since vote shares might have 
been very different. Thus we run OLS regressions in which the log of the vote share is the 
dependent variable. We control for gender and whether the investor was institutional. We also 
add dummies for the time periods and control for the share of extraordinary meetings, distance 
and number of investors per year, as above. The results are shown in Table 10. One can clearly 
see that the share of votes for men and women did not significantly differ. However, 
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unsurprisingly, institutional investors had significantly more votes than ordinary investors. If 
we include the variable of social class, ranking from 1 (upper class) to 4 (lower middle class), 
it seems that the vote share of the lower class declined significantly. However, if we only add 
a dummy for investors from the middle class (the one that we used in the logit regressions), the 
voting share is not significantly different.  
 
Table 10: Vote shares 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ln(vote share) 
Sample All investors that could be categorised 
Only male and female 
investors 
All investors that could be 
categorised 
Women -0.321** -0.0692 -0.0924   
 (0.154) (0.152) (0.155)   
Institutional investors   1.545***   
   (0.114)   
Social class    -0.172*  
    (0.104)  
Social class below upperclass (<3)     -0.157 
     (0.234) 
1914–1917 -0.0460 -0.139 -0.0198 -0.316 -0.309 
 (0.200) (0.210) (0.196) (0.290) (0.290) 
1918–1922 2.027*** 2.261*** 1.970*** 2.414*** 2.414*** 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.107) (0.165) (0.165) 
1923–1928 0.0783 -0.0939 -0.0570 0.291* 0.287* 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.0991) (0.161) (0.160) 
1929–1933 0.110 0.0243 0.000436 0.326* 0.318* 
 (0.106) (0.114) (0.104) (0.168) (0.168) 
1934–1945 0.0239 0.484*** -0.342** 0.814*** 0.805*** 
 (0.138) (0.163) (0.153) (0.216) (0.216) 
Share extraordinary meetings -0.354*** -0.189*** -0.333*** -0.157* -0.156* 
 (0.0588) (0.0611) (0.0578) (0.0806) (0.0806) 
Number of investors per year -0.00155*** -0.00177*** -0.00151*** -0.00167*** -0.00167*** 
 (7.15e-05) (7.50e-05) (7.10e-05) (9.86e-05) (9.87e-05) 
Distance from investor’s residence to 
location of GM 0.0158* 0.0183* 0.00925 -0.0195* -0.0184 
 (0.00880) (0.00941) (0.00959) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Constant -5.034*** -5.163*** -5.193*** -4.829*** -5.013*** 
 (0.0800) (0.0792) (0.0761) (0.167) (0.122) 
      
Observations 12,911 11,142 12,911 5,886 5,886 
R-squared 0.084 0.119 0.122 0.098 0.098 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered by investors. 
 
In a second step, we aggregate the data at the level of general meetings. More precisely, since 
we observe, on average, about six general meetings per firm, we construct an unbalanced panel, 
where the ID variable is the firm and the time variable is the date of the general meeting. Here, 
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we focus first on the measures of concentration from section II and show whether they changed 
over time if we control for meeting specific characteristics and, additionally, for time-invariant 
firm characteristics with firm fixed effects. The results confirm the findings of the descriptive 
statistics and are shown in Table 11. Overall, the level of concentration is remarkably stable. 
Only C1 seems to significantly increase in the period of 1923 to 1933. However, the coefficients 
slightly increase over time. Thus, we re-estimate the regressions including only one time 
dummy for the period of 1924–1933. As Table 12 reveals, this time dummy is significant for 
the Herfindahl index and the share of the largest investors. Thus, concentration did rise 
significantly in the period after hyperinflation until the Nazis took over. 
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Table 11: Concentration over time, Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(herfindahl) ln(c1) ln(c3) ln(cthres) ln(herfindahl) ln(c1) ln(c3) ln(cthres) 
 pooled FE 
1914–1917 -0.00838 0.110 -0.0591 -0.354*** 0.0998 0.444** 0.0717 -0.434*** 
 (0.0833) (0.230) (0.0788) (0.126) (0.0881) (0.223) (0.0912) (0.119) 
1918–1922 -0.0439 -0.154 -0.00271 0.0831 -0.00139 0.126 0.0167 -0.0672 
 (0.0700) (0.220) (0.0674) (0.157) (0.0721) (0.236) (0.0878) (0.132) 
1923–1928 -0.00332 0.0351 0.00577 -0.161 0.0973 0.359* 0.0688 -0.194* 
 (0.0715) (0.218) (0.0634) (0.141) (0.0618) (0.189) (0.0702) (0.117) 
1929–1933 0.00109 0.0353 0.0172 0.000305 0.0797 0.327 0.0780 -0.165 
 (0.0683) (0.213) (0.0608) (0.181) (0.0676) (0.209) (0.0753) (0.125) 
1934–1945 -0.00511 0.0796 0.0372 -0.0673 0.0297 0.214 0.0445 -0.0414 
 (0.0687) (0.223) (0.0680) (0.151) (0.0777) (0.254) (0.0891) (0.146) 
Extraordinary meetings (=1) -0.0186 -0.0477 -0.0574* 0.0753 0.00157 0.0375 5.79e-05 -0.0777 
 (0.0218) (0.0691) (0.0310) (0.102) (0.0266) (0.0764) (0.0210) (0.0623) 
Overall share capital per year 0.00782 0.0253 0.00172 0.00233 -0.0169 -0.00999 0.00308 -0.00162 
 (0.00884) (0.0348) (0.0133) (0.0241) (0.0115) (0.0356) (0.0123) (0.0316) 
Number of GMs per year 0.000740 0.00381 0.000846 -0.00505** 0.00193** 0.00304 0.00130 -0.00118 
 (0.000827) (0.00269) (0.00108) (0.00219) (0.000847) (0.00288) (0.00107) (0.00220) 
Constant 0.300*** -1.503*** 0.660*** 1.411*** 0.297*** -1.578*** 0.590*** 1.397*** 
 (0.0525) (0.175) (0.0530) (0.116) (0.0625) (0.206) (0.0751) (0.116) 
Firm fixed effects n n n n y y y y 
Observations 721 721 760 720 710 710 749 709 
R-squared 0.012 0.019 0.016 0.032 0.033 0.037 0.029 0.045 
Number of firms 257 257 272 257 257 257 272 257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 12: Concentration over time, 1924–1933 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ln(herfindahl) ln(c1) ln(c3) ln(cthres) 
     
1924-1933 0.0716** 0.201** 0.0505 -0.115 
 (0.0305) (0.1000) (0.0334) (0.0809) 
Extraordinary meetings (=1) 0.000655 0.0331 -0.00189 -0.0763 
 (0.0258) (0.0716) (0.0205) (0.0606) 
Overall share capital per year -0.0163 -0.0197 -0.000431 0.00190 
 (0.0123) (0.0348) (0.0105) (0.0307) 
Number of GMs per year 0.00148* 0.00280 0.00128* -0.000837 
 (0.000815) (0.00236) (0.000699) (0.00198) 
Constant 0.325*** -1.395*** 0.627*** 1.302*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0963) (0.0280) (0.0591) 
Firm fixed effects y y y y 
Observations 710 710 749 709 
R-squared 0.022 0.020 0.024 0.015 
Number of firms 257 257 272 257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered at firm level. 
 
We then run the same model, using the share of women and the mean of social class as 
dependent variables. The results are shown in Table 13. This regression reveals some interesting 
new aspects. First, the share of lower social classes does not change significantly over time; in 
fact, it seems to decline. Furthermore, the share of women rises after 1919, similar to our new 
aspects. First, the share of lower social classes does not change significantly over time; in fact, 
it seems to decline. Furthermore, the share of women rises after 1919, similar to our previous 
findings, if we estimate the panel without firm fixed effects. If we include firm fixed effects, 
the share of women falls significantly in our observation period. Since 98% of the women were 
only engaged in one firm, this reveals that some of these women withdrew their engagement in 
this period.  
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Table 13: Panel  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES socialclass Share of women socialclass Share of women 
         
1914–1917 0.0227 0.0427 0.00640 -0.0133     
 (0.0917) (0.0792) (0.0166) (0.0185)     
1918–1922 -0.0189 0.00277 0.0368* 0.0195     
 (0.0429) (0.0626) (0.0188) (0.0179)     
1923–1928 -0.00445 -0.0149 0.0252 0.000770     
 (0.0315) (0.0325) (0.0163) (0.0132)     
1929–1933 0.00395 -0.00934 0.0269* -0.00444     
 (0.0344) (0.0385) (0.0142) (0.0121)     
1934–1945 0.0274 0.00592 0.0298* 0.0151     
 (0.0404) (0.0627) (0.0157) (0.0158)     
1924–1933     0.000382 -0.0188 0.00487 -0.0135** 
     (0.0189) (0.0270) (0.0132) (0.00585) 
Share of extraordinary meetings 0.00261 0.00574 -0.00715 -0.000375 0.000968 0.00516 -0.00726 -0.000207 
 (0.0205) (0.0191) (0.00921) (0.00574) (0.0209) (0.0193) (0.00944) (0.00568) 
Number of GMs (year) 0.000471 -0.000207 -0.000397 -0.000229 9.80e-05 -0.000310 -4.24e-05 -4.81e-05 
 (0.000577) (0.000920) (0.000298) (0.000202) (0.000397) (0.000549) (0.000144) (0.000142) 
Herfindahl -0.0510 0.0607 -0.0765*** -0.0415*** -0.0499 0.0651 -0.0774*** -0.0430*** 
 (0.0571) (0.0735) (0.0193) (0.0133) (0.0571) (0.0820) (0.0195) (0.0147) 
Constant 1.086*** 1.068*** 0.0504*** 0.0482*** 1.096*** 1.076*** 0.0610*** 0.0541*** 
 (0.0412) (0.0273) (0.0157) (0.00801) (0.0365) (0.0296) (0.0172) (0.00785) 
Firm fixed effects n y n y n y n y 
Observations 674 663 721 710 674 663 721 710 
R-squared 0.007 0.013 0.058 0.068 0.004 0.010 0.048 0.053 
Number of firms 244 244 257 257 244 244 257 257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered at firm level. 
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6 Conclusion 
We studied the ownership structure of joint-stock firms for the period of 1869 to 1945 based on 
a unique hand-collected data set. The data covers a selection of 785 general meetings of 276 
firms, covering the information of 10,017 individual investors over the period of 1869 to 1945. 
We can show that after the hyperinflation of 1923, when shares became cheaper, ownership 
among the lower social classes and women increased significantly. These results are robust to 
different approaches that aim at controlling for a potential selection bias. However, the despite 
the greater participation of women and the lower social classes after 1923, there remained a 
vast inequality of opportunities in terms of capital ownership and control. Thus, regardless of 
the political changes and new economic conditions, the control of the joint-stock firms largely 
remained in the hands of investors from the upper class and large banks. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: Archive Sources and Signatures 
 
 
Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archiv (WABW) 
 
 
Signature Name of the firm 
B 26 / 50-67 Bleicherei, Färberei und Appreturanstalt GmbH, Uhingen  
B 30 / 153 A. Stotz AG, Stuttgart 
B 40 / 17, 226 Koehler AG, Oberkirch 
B 40 / 228 W. Euler Maschinenpapierfabrik AG, Bensheim 
B 49 / 228 Koehler AG, Oberkirch 
B 150 / 1744-1749,  
             2347, 2371 Salamander AG, Kornwestheim 
B 150 / 2371 J. Sigel & Cie. Schuhfabrik AG, Kornwestheim 
B 2001 / 10, 136 Elektrizitätswerke Argen AG, Wangen im Allgäu 
B 2007 / 263 Kraftwerke Untere Mindel AG, Burgau 
B 2023 / 15-16 Württembergische Sammelschienen AG, Stuttgart 
 
 
 
 
Bavarian Economic Archive (BWA) 
 
 
Signature Name of the firm 
V 5 / 3 Aktienbrauerei zum Löwenbräu, München 
V 5 / 8 Deutsche Lebensversicherungsbank Arminia AG, München 
V 5 / 16 August Riedener Ballonfabrik AG, Augsburg 
V 5 / 17 Aktienbrauerei Augsburg AG, Augsburg 
V 5 / 19 Paulanerbräu Salvatorbrauerei AG, München 
V 5 / 22 
 
Allgäuer Baumwollspinnerei und Weberei  
(vorm. Heinrich Gyr), Blaichach 
V 5 / 26, 504 Ziegelei Augsburg, Augsburg 
V 5 / 29 Artes-Verlag AG, München 
V 5 / 49 Buntpapierfabrik AG, Aschaffenburg 
V 5 / 51 AG für Maschinenpapierfabrikation, Aschaffenburg 
V 5 / 52 Niederrheinische Zellstoff AG, Walsum am Rhein 
V 5 / 66-67 Nationalbank für Deutschland, Berlin 
V 5 / 70 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, Shanghai 
V 5 / 74 Bayerische Notenbank, München 
V 5 / 84I, 82, 84I Barmer Bankverein, Barmen 
V 5 / 87 Bayerische Bodenkreditanstalt, Würzburg 
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V 5 / 90 
 
Bayerische Celluloidwarenfabrik  
(vorm. Albert Wacker AG), Nürnberg 
V 5 / 91 Bayernwerke für Holzverwertung AG, München 
V 5 / 96 Balnea AG für Reiseandenken und Fotochrombilder, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 101 Schuhfabrik E. Heimann Aktiengesellschaft, Schweinfurt 
V 5 / 104, 997 Bayerisches Portlandzementwerk Marienstein AG, München 
V 5 / 107 Bayerische Rumplerwerke AG, Augsburg 
V 5 / 110 Bürgerliches Brauhaus, Ingolstadt 
V 5 / 111 Bayerische Wolldeckenfabrik Bruckmühl AG, München 
V 5 / 128, 132 
 
Bamberger Mälzerei AG (vorm. Carl J. Dessauer), Bamberg 
und Mälzfabrik Stuttgart AG, Stuttgart 
V 5 / 129 Bürstenfabrik Erlangen AG (vorm. Emil Kränzlein), Erlangen 
V 5 / 130 Brauerei Geismann AG, Fürth 
V 5 / 135 Bleistiftfabrik vorm. Johann Faber AG, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 139 Bayerische Bauindustrie AG, München 
V 5 / 141-143 Bayerische Granitaktiengesellschaft, Regensburg 
V 5 / 151, 153-154 Gebrüder Bing AG, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 155, 157 Bürstenfabrik Pensberger & Co. AG, München 
V 5 / 158, 160 Bruckmann AG, München 
V 5 / 163-164I, 166 Bergmann Elektrizitätswerke AG, Berlin 
V 5 / 169 Bayerische Aktiengesellschaft für Energiewirtschaft, Bamberg 
V 5 / 171 Continentale Gesellschaft für elektrische Unternehmungen, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 172-173 Chemische Werke Brockhues AG, Niederwalluf am Rhein 
V 5 / 175 AG für chemische Produkte (vorm. H. Scheidemandel), Landshut 
V 5 / 217 Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerks- und Hütten AG, Berlin 
V 5 / 219 Druckerei und Kartonagen (vorm. Gebrüder Obpacher AG), München  
V 5 / 221, 745 Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft, Berlin 
V 5 / 222 Danubia AG für Mineralölindustrie, Regensburg 
V 5 / 224, 245I, 245II Elektrizitäts-AG (vormals Schuckert & Co.), Nürnberg 
V 5 / 227-228 Elsenthal Holzstoff- und Papierfabrik AG, Grafenau 
V 5 / 241 Grünerbräu AG, Fürth 
V 5 / 248-249 Polyphonwerke AG, Leipzig 
V 5 / 250, 252 Graphitwerk Kropfmühl AG, München 
V 5 / V253 Aktiengesellschaft für Gasindustrie, Augsburg 
V 5 / 258-260 
 
Gesellschaft für elektrische Unternehmungen Ludwig  
Loewe & Co AG, Berlin 
V 5 / 263 Solenhofer Aktienverein AG, Altendorf bei Sonhofen 
V 5 / 265 Julius Sichel & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft a. Aktien, Mainz 
V 5 / 266 Süddeutsche Metallwerke AG, München 
V 5 / 271 Schlossbrauerei Planegg AG, Planegg 
V 5 / 278-279 Süddeutsche Holzindustrie AG, München 
V 5 / 280-298 AG für Seilindustrie (vormals Ferdinand Wolff), Mannheim-Neckarau 
V 5 / 294, 295I, 295II AG Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilianhütte, Rosenberg 
V 5 / 305 Hotel Aktiengesellschaft, München 
V 5 / 308 Hauser & Sobotka Getreide AG, München 
V 5 / 309-310 F. H. Hammersen Aktiengesellschaft, Osnabrück 
V 5 / 312-313, 316, 318 Johannes Haag Maschinen- und Röhrenfabrik AG, Augsburg 
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V 5 / 333 Georg Müller Verlag AG, München 
V 5 / 334 Mohr & Co. AG, München 
V 5 / 336 Mandruck AG, München 
V 5 / 348 Mechanische Baumwoll- Spinnerei und Weberei, Kaufbeuren 
V 5 / 349 Minimax AG, Berlin 
V 5 / 350-351 Münchener Export Malzfabrik München AG, München 
V 5 / 361 Mannheimer Versicherungsgesellschaft AG, Mannheim 
V 5 / 374 Spinnerei und Weberei Kottern, Kottern 
V 5 / 441 Mechanische Flachs-Spinnerei Bayreuth, Laineck 
V 5 / 501-502 Aktiengesellschaft Zuckerfabrik, Offstein 
V 5 / 505 Zwirnerei und Nähfadenfabrik Göggingen 
V 5 / 539 Lobers Fleischwerke AG, Augsburg 
V 5 / 541-542 Aktiengesellschaft für Lederfabrikation, München 
V 5 / 545I Landshuter Keks- und Schokoladenfabrik AG, Landshut 
V 5 / 549 Localbahn AG, München 
V 5 / 551 Lux´sche Industriewerke AG, Ludwigshafen am Rhein 
V 5 / 555-557 Lithoponefabrikation, Triebes 
V 5 / 559 Ulmer Brauereigesellschaft, Ulm 
V 5 / 587 Aktiengesellschaft Waggonfabrik Jos. Rathgeber, München-Moosach 
V 5 / 589I Eisenwerkgesellschaft Maximilianshütte, München 
V 5 / 613, 2015-2016 Lech-Elektrizitätswerke AG, Augsburg 
V 5 / 626 Wollwaarenfabrik Mercur, Liegnitz 
V 5 / 627-628, 630 Wayss & Freytag AG, Frankfurt am Main 
V 5 / 696 Vereinigte Zwieseler & Pirnaerfarbenglaswerke AG, München 
V 5 / 718 
 
Vereinigte Fabriken landwirtschaftlicher Maschinen 
(vormals Epple & Buxbaum), Augsburg 
V 5 / 726 
 
Vereinigte Landsberger Pflug- und Münchener  
Eggenfabriken AG, München-Pasing 
V 5 / 728 Lithographisch-Artistische Anstalt, München 
V 5 / 740 Ostbayerische Stromversorgung AG, München 
V 5 / 754 Vereinigte Glaswerke AG, Augsburg 
V 5 / 756-757 AG Verlagsanstalt, München 
V 5 / 814, 822, 833 Terraingesellschaft Neu-Westend AG, München 
V 5 / 815 München-Pasinger Terraingesellschaft AG, München 
V 5 / 821 Aktiengesellschaft Petuel'sche Terrain-Gesellschaft, München-Riesenfeld 
V 5 / 824-829 Teisnacher Papierfabrik, Teisnach 
V 5 / 836 Terrain-Aktiengesellschaft Herzogpark-München-Gern, München 
V 5 / 837 Terraingesellschaft München-Friedenheim AG, München 
V 5 / 844I Phoenix AG für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb, Düsseldorf 
V 5 / 862-865 Vereinigte Schuhfabriken Berneis-Wessels AG, Augsburg 
V 5 / 867 Vereinigte Fränkische Schuhfabriken, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 875 Aktiengesellschaft für Bleicherei, Färberei, Appretur & Druckerei, Augsburg 
V 5 / 844I Gelsenkirchener Berkwerksgesellschaft, Essen 
V 5 / 906 Kunstmühle Tivoli AG, München 
V 5 / 959 Oberpfalzwerke AG für Elektrizitätsversorgung, Regensburg 
V 5 / 961, 963 Oberbayerische Überlandzentrale AG, München 
V 5 / 964, 966 Ostwerke AG, Berlin 
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V 5 / 984 Prinzregentenplatz AG, München 
V 5 / 988, 990 Papierfabrik Hegge, Kempten 
V 5 / 994 Porzellanfabrik Tirschenreuth AG, Tirschenreuth 
V 5 / 998 Bayerische Trasswerke AG, München 
V 5 / 1001 Süddeutsche Bank, Mannheim 
V 5 / 1023, 1025 Aktiengesellschaft Jesuitenbrauerei, Regensburg 
V 5 / 1028 Rhein-Main-Donau AG, München 
V 5 / 1588 Deutsche Hypothekenbank, Weimar (Meiningen) 
V 5 / 1619 Diamalt AG, München 
V 5 / 1709 Fränkische Überlandwerk AG, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 1746 Grosskraftwerk Franken AG, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 1763 Hackerbräu AG, München 
V 5 / 1771 Hanfwerke Füssen-Immenstadt AG, Füssen 
V 5 / 1913, 1915 Ampferwerke Elektrizitäts-AG, München 
V 5 / 2022 Leonische Drahtwerke AG, Nürnberg 
V 5 / 2084 Mannesmannröhren-Werke, Düsseldorf 
V 5 / 2111 Gesellschaft für Markt- und Kühlhallen, Hamburg 
 
 
 
 
Hessian Economic Archive (HWA) 
 
 
Signature Name of the firm 
HWA 101 / 41, 1020 Nassau-Selterser Mineralquellen AG, Oberselters (Nassau) 
HWA 115 / 26 Hartmann & Braun AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 30 Zellstofffabrik Waldhof, Mannheim-Waldhof 
HWA 115 / 50 Illkircher Mühlenwerke AG (vorm. Baumann freres), Strassbourg 
HWA 115 / 65 Vereinigte Schuhfabriken Berneis-Wessels AG, Augsburg 
HWA 115 / 81 M. Melliand Chemische Fabrik AG, Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 87 Emil Herminghaus AG, Velbert 
HWA 115 / 90 Metallwerke Unterweser AG (Friedrich-August-Hütte), Oldenburg 
HWA 115 / 116 
 
Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt 
(vorm. Roessler), Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 122 Dampfkesselfabrik (vorm. Arthur Rodberg), Darmstadt 
HWA 115 / 123 Rheinische Stahlwerke Essen, Duisburg-Meiderich 
HWA 115 / 126 Rhenser Mineralbrunnen Fritz Meyer & Co. AG, Rhens am Rhein 
HWA 115 / 144 Kahlgrund-Eisenbahn AG, Schöllkrippen 
HWA 115 / 145 Messingwerke AG, Elberfeld 
HWA 115 / 147 Zuckerfabrik Offstein AG, Offstein 
HWA 115 / 151 Zementfabrik Bernhard Löhr, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 160 Maschinenbaugesellschaft, Karlsruhe 
HWA 115 / 165 Uhrenfabrik (vorm. L. Furtwängler Söhne AG), Furtwangen 
HWA 115 / 170 Union Aktienbrauerei (vormals C. Ueberle & E. Charlier), Trier 
HWA 115 / 179 Hansa Loyd Werke AG, Bremen 
HWA 115 / 186 Süddeutsche Zucker AG, Mannheim 
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HWA 115 / 188 Salzwerk Heilbronn, Heilbronn 
HWA 115 / 189 
 
Hüttenwerk Niederschöneweide AG  
(vorm. J.F. Binsberg), Berlin-Niederschöneweide 
HWA 115 / 194 Sachtleben AG für Bergbau und Chemische Industrie, Köln 
HWA 115 / 196 Verein chemischer Fabriken, Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 197 Vereinigte Königs- und Laurahütte, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 199 Kalle & Co AG, Wiesbaden-Biebrich 
HWA 115 / 201 
 
Lämmerspieler Metallwaren und Schraubenfabrik  
Melber & Co AG, Lämmerspiel 
HWA 115 / 203 Verein deutscher Oelfabriken, Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 205 
 
Kasseler Verkehrsgesellschaft  
(vorm. Große Kasseler Straßenbahn AG), Kassel 
HWA 115 / 207 
 
H. Hildebrand & Söhne Rheinmühlenwerke AG  
(vorm. Rheinmühlenwerke AG), Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 208 Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke AG, Riesa 
HWA 115 / 219 Westdeutsche Jutespinnerei und Weberei, Beuel am Rhein 
HWA 115 / 222 C.H. Knorr AG, Heilbronn 
HWA 115 / 237 Helios Elektrizitäts AG, Köln 
HWA 155 / 240  Vereinigte Strohstofffabriken AG, Dresden 
HWA 115 / 250 Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG, Düsseldorf 
HWA 115 / 254 Danziger Elektrische Straßenbahnen AG, Danzig 
HWA 115 / 262 Löhnberger Mühle AG, Siegen 
HWA 115 / 271 Deutsche Vereinsbank, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 279 Klöckner Werke AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 293 Lothringen Portland-Cement Werke, Metz 
HWA 115 / 311 Schultz-Grünlack AG, Rüdesheim am Rhein 
HWA 115 / 318 Schaffner & Albert AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 333 
 
Darmstädter Herdfabrik und Eisengieserei  
Gebrüder Roeder AG, Darmstadt 
HWA 115 / 336 Harpener Bergbau AG, Dortmund 
HWA 115 / 338 Vereinsbank Filiale Hamburg 
HWA 115 / 344 Dresden-Leipziger Schellpressen Fabrik AG, Kötzschenbroda-Naundorf 
HWA 115 / 350 Gesellschaft für Lindes Eismaschinen AG, Wiesbaden 
HWA 115 / 358 Lüdenscheider Metallwerke AG (vorm. Jul. Fischer & Basse), Lüdenscheid 
HWA 115 / 361 Mannesmannröhren-Werke, Düsseldorf 
HWA 115 / 362 Gebrüder Lutz AG, Darmstadt 
HWA 115 / 364 Vereinigte Fassfabriken, Kassel 
HWA 115 / 370 
 
Leander Schuhfabrik AG  
(vorm. Ochsenhirt & Behrens), Offenbach am Main 
HWA 115 / 374 Lux´sche Industriewerke AG, Ludwigshafen am Rhein 
HWA 115 / 375 Heinrich Lanz AG, Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 391 Heidelberger Federhalter Fabrik Koch Weber & Co., Heidelberg 
HWA 115 / 394 Dresdner Bank Filiale Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 395 Kommunales Elektrizitätswerk Mark AG, Westfalen 
HWA 115 / 400 Vereinigte Jute-Spinnerei und Webereien AG, Hamburg 
HWA 115 / 401 Rudolf Karstadt Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg 
HWA 115 / 410 Holzverkohlungs-Industrie AG, Konstanz 
HWA 115 / 518 Deutsche Steinzeug- und Kunststoff  
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 Warenfabrik AG, Mannheim-Friedrichsfeld 
HWA 115 / 557 Nassau-Selterser Mineralquellen AG, Oberselters (Nassau) 
HWA 115 / 582 Kraftwerk Altwürttemberg, Beihingen am Neckar 
HWA 115 / 825 Löwenbräu München AG, München 
HWA 115 / 834 Heidelberger Straßen- und Bergbahn AG, Heidelberg 
HWA 115 / 854 Veith Gummiwerke AG, Sanbach (Höchst) 
HWA 115 / 981 Elektrische Licht- & Kraftanlagen AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 982 Elektrizitäts-Lieferungs-Gesellschaft AG, Hannover 
HWA 115 / 984 Enzinger Union Werke AG, Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 1053 
 
Aktiengesellschaft für Glasindustrie (vorm. Friedrich Siemens), Dresden 
und Stralauer Glashütte AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 1079 Dyckerhoff & Widmann AG, Wiesbaden 
HWA 115 / 1247 
 
Heddernheimer Kupferwerk & Süddeutsche  
Kabelwerke AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 1361 
 
Württembergische und Badische Vereinigte  
Versicherungsgesellschaft AG, Heilbronn 
HWA 115 / 1539 Aktiengesellschaft für Verkehrswesen, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 1543 Accumulatoren-Fabrik AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 1655 Grün & Bilfinger AG, Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 1662 Main-Kraftwerke AG, Höchst 
HWA 115 / 1741 
 
Stuttgarter Vereins Versicherungs-AG, Stuttgart 
und Allianz Versicherungs-AG, Berlin 
und Stuttgarter Berliner Versicherung, Stuttgart 
HWA 115 / 1764 AG für Seilindustrie (vormals Ferdinand Wolff), Mannheim-Neckarau 
HWA 115 / 1771 Allgemeine Lokalbahn- und kraftwerke-AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 1787 
 
Stuttgart-Lübeck Lebensversicherungs AG, Stuttgart 
und Stuttgarter Lebensversicherungsbank AG, Stuttgart 
HWA 115 / 1953 Brauerei Schwartz-Storchen AG, Speyer 
HWA 115 / 1980 Bank für Brau-Industrie, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 2005 Bierbrauerei Durlacher Hof AG (vorm. Hagen), Mannheim 
HWA 115 / 2018 Buntpapierfabrik AG, Aschaffenburg 
HWA 115 / 2019 Brauerei Wulle AG, Stuttgart 
HWA 115 / 2037 
 
Chemische Fabrik Milch AG, Oranienburg 
und Chemische Produkten-Fabrik AG, Pommernsdorf 
HWA 115 / 2285 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, Shanghai 
HWA 115 / 2286 Deutsch-Atlantische Telegesellschaft, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 2287 Deutsche Eisenbahn-Betriebs-Gesellschaft AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 2288 Überseeische Bank, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 2324 Spinnerei und Weberei Ettlingen 
HWA 115 / 2392 Düsseldorf-Ratinger Röhrenkesselfabrik (vorm. Dürr & Co.), Ratingen 
HWA 115 / 2480 Frankona Rück- und Mitversicherungs-AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 2487 Frankfurter Bank, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 2619 Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt AG, Hamburg 
HWA 115 / 2622 Brauerei Henninger AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 2651 Hanfwerke Füssen-Immenstadt AG, Füssen 
HWA 115 / 2669 Hochtief AG (vormals Gebr. Helfmann), Essen 
HWA 115 / 2808 Ilse Bergbau- Actiengesellschaft, Bückgen bei Großräschen 
HWA 115 / 2844 Chr. Adt. Kupferberg & Co., Mainz 
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HWA 115 / 2845 
 
Kaliwerke Neu-Stassfurt Friedrichshall AG, Neu-Stassfurt 
und Rhenania-Künheim Verein Chemischer Fabriken AG, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 2939 Mainzer Aktien Bierbrauerei AG, Mainz 
HWA 115 / 2952 Hafenmühle, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 3003 Mansfeld Aktiengesellschaft für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb, Eisleben 
HWA 115 / 3028 Neu Guinea Compagnie, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 3052 
 
Adler & Oppenheimer AG  
(ab 1940 Norddeutsche Lederwerke AG), Berlin 
HWA 115 / 3145 Otavi Minen- und Eisenbahngesellschaft, Berlin 
HWA 115 / 3282 Pfälzische Mühlenwerke, Mannheim 
  
HWA 115 / 3283 
 
Frankfurter Maschinenbau AG  
(vorm. Pokorny & Wittekind), Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 3534 Schriftgiesserei D. Stempel AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 115 / 3550 Schramm Lack- und Farbenfabriken AG, Offenbach am Main 
HWA 115 / 3737 Voltohm, Seil- & Kabelwerke AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 118 / 1102-1108 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke AG, Einsal (Altona) 
HWA 118 / 1174 AG Heddernheimer Kupferwerk (vorm. F. A. Heße Söhne), Heddernheim 
HWA 118 / 1499 - 1500 Berg-Heckmann-Selve AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 119 / 161 Berg- und Metallbank AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 119 / 1667-1670 Metallhütte AG, Duisburg 
HWA 166 / 19 Schwarz & Ulrich A.G., Friedberg 
HWA 167 / 1 Metallbank AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 167 / 1+2 Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG, Frankfurt am Main 
HWA 173 / 159 Main-Kraftwerke AG, Höchst 
HWA 173 / 202-216 Lahnkraftwerke AG, Wiesbaden 
HWA 179 / 52 Berliner Notruf Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin 
HWA 179 / 76 Berliner Privat-Telefon GmbH, Berlin 
HWA 179 / 224 Hanseatische Notruf AG, Hamburg 
HWA 187 / 187-209 Firma Goebel AG, Darmstadt 
HWA 203 / 4-5 
 
Vereinigte Kapselfabriken Nackenheim Beyerbach  
Nachfolger Aktiengesellschaft, Nackenheim 
HWA 217 / 3-8-62 
 
Rheinischer Aktienverein für Weinbau und Weinhandel  
Dilthey Sahl & Co., Rüdesheim am Rhein 
HWA 2017 / 83 Dürener Metallwerke AG, Düren 
HWA Gas und Elektrizitätswerke AG, Nassau am Lahn 
 
 
 
Historical Archive of the Commerzbank AG 
 
Signature Name of the firm 
HAC 1 / 143, 143I, 143II Commerz- und Privatbank AG, Berlin / Hamburg 
HAC 1 / 468 Commerz- und Privatbank AG, Filiale Plauen 
HAC 1 / 669 Buderus´sche Eisenwerke, Wetzlar 
HAC 1 / 675 Georg Geiling und Co. AG, Bacharach am Rhein 
HAC 3 / 56 Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank, Frankfurt am Main 
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HAC 4 / 23 Barmer Bank-Verein Hinsberg Fischer & Comp., Barmen 
 
 
 
Historical Archive of the Deutschen Bank AG 
 
 
Signature Name of the firm 
F 038 / 0340 Zwirnerei & Nähfadenfabrik AG, Göggingen 
K 1 / 949 Norddeutsche Bank, Hamburg 
K 1 / 984 Albingia Versicherungs AG, Hamburg 
K 9 / 6 Süddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft, Mannheim 
K 9 / 12 Deutsche Bank AG, Berlin 
K 15 / 9-17 Bergisch Märkischen Bank, Elberfeld 
K 19 / 48 Hildesheimer Bank, Hildesheim 
P 00705 Bergbau AG Lothringen, Bochum 
P 01178 Finow Kupfer & Messingwerke AG, Finow 
P 02985 Gothaer Waggonfabrik AG, Gotha 
P 03547 Zugtelefonie AG, Berlin 
P 04500 Thüringische Glasinstrumentenfabrik Alt, Eberhardt & Jäger AG, Ilmenau 
P 04682 Vereinigte Brauereien AG, Meiningen 
P 05299 Berliner Lombardkasse AG, Berlin 
S 4020 Rheinische Creditbank, Mannheim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A2: Classification Industrial Sectors 
 
Industry 
Banking 
Insurance 
Mining 
Heavy Industry 
Light Industry 
Food Processing 
Transportation 
Chemical Industry 
Public Utility 
Others 
Source: Lehmann-Hasemeyer/Opitz 2017, p. 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
